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BEYOND HEADLINES & HOLDINGS: EXPLORING SOME LESS
OBVIOUS RAMIFICATIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT’S 2017
FREE-SPEECH RULINGS
Clay Calvert*
ABSTRACT
Digging behind the holdings, this Article analyzes less conspicuous, yet highly
consequential aspects of the United States Supreme Court’s First Amendment rulings
during the opening half of 2017. The four facets of the opinions addressed here—
items both within individual cases and cutting across them—hold vast significance
for future free-speech battles. Nuances of the justices’ splintering in Matal v. Tam,
Packingham v. North Carolina, and Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman are
examined, as is the immediate impact of Justice Anthony Kennedy’s Packingham
dicta regarding online social networks. Furthermore, Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s solo
concurrence in the threats case of Perez v. Florida is explored.
INTRODUCTION
During the first six months of 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court issued three major
decisions involving the First Amendment.1 Each marked a victory for free speech
and was rendered without participation by the Court’s newest member, Justice Neil
Gorsuch.2
* Professor & Brechner Eminent Scholar in Mass Communication and Director of the
Marion B. Brechner First Amendment Project at the University of Florida, Gainesville, Fla.
BA, 1987, Communication, Stanford University; JD (Order of the Coif), 1991, McGeorge
School of Law, University of the Pacific; PhD, 1996, Communication, Stanford University.
Member, State Bar of California. The author thanks Hannah Beatty, Jessie Goodman, and
Jayde Shulman of the Marion B. Brechner First Amendment Project for their careful review
of early drafts of this Article.
1 See, e.g., Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017); Packingham v. North Carolina, 137
S. Ct. 1730 (2017); Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144 (2017). The
First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides, in pertinent part, that “Congress shall
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.” The Free Speech and Free
Press Clauses were incorporated more than ninety years ago through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment Due Process Clause as fundamental liberties to apply to state and local government
entities and officials. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
2 See generally Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744; Packingham, 137 S. Ct. 1730; Expressions Hair
Design, 137 S. Ct. 1144; see also Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Neil Gorsuch Is Sworn In as Supreme
Court Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2oj1Xef.
899
900 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 26:899
In Matal v. Tam,3 the Court—without dissent—struck down the disparagement
clause4 of the Lanham Act.5 That provision vests the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO) with authority to deny registration for marks that disparage
individuals and institutions.6 The PTO invoked the clause to deny Simon Tam’s
application to register his band’s name, The Slants, because it denigrates Asians.7
The PTO’s decision came despite the twin facts that Tam is Asian-American and
that he sought to reappropriate the word “slant,” eliminating its sting.8
Delivering the Court’s judgment for Tam and The Slants, Justice Samuel Alito
reasoned that the disparagement clause “offends a bedrock First Amendment principle:
Speech may not be banned on the ground that it expresses ideas that offend.”9 Justice
Anthony Kennedy, penning a concurrence joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan, added that it “constitutes viewpoint discrimi-
nation—a form of speech suppression so potent that it must be subject to rigorous
constitutional scrutiny. The Government’s action and the statute on which it is based
cannot survive this scrutiny.”10
3 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017).
4 See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2012) (giving the United States Patent and Trademark Office
authority to deny registration for a mark that “may disparage or falsely suggest a connection
with persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into con-
tempt, or disrepute”).
5 Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1765. The Lanham Act is “the foundation of trademark law today.”
Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J.
1687, 1687 (1999). It was passed by Congress in 1946 “in order to liberalize the law of unfair
competition.” Jeremy A. Rovinsky, Troubleshooting Legal Malfunction: Lexmark and Con-
sumer Standing Under the Lanham Act, 48 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 453, 453 (2015). It “was
written as a broad remedial statute intended to provide harmony to a patchwork of previous
trademark laws.” Id. at 454. The Act takes its name from U.S. Representative Fritz Lanham
of Texas, who introduced “the bill that would become the federal Trademark Act of 1946.”
Sondra Levine, The Origins of the Lanham Act, 19 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 22, 25 (2010).
6 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a).
7 Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1754.
8 As one article explains:
Mr. Tam chose the name The Slants, he said, after he did an informal
survey asking people what they thought all Asians had in common. The
most frequent answer was slanted eyes. Because he grew up hearing that
slur and being ridiculed, he thought he could take the term back, reap-
propriate the insult from decades ago.
Paula Reed Ward, The Slants Challenge Trademark Rejection, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE,
Apr. 28, 2017, at A1; see also Robert Barnes, Next Gig for Band: Defending Its Name, WASH.
POST, Jan. 16, 2017, at A1 (reporting that The Slants are an “all Asian American, Chinatown
dance-rock band” and that “[s]ome Asian American groups support Tam’s attempt to reap-
propriate a slur and make it a point of pride, as other artists of color have done”).
9 Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1751.
10 Id. at 1765 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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The same day it issued Tam, the Court in Packingham v. North Carolina11
declared unconstitutional a state statute prohibiting registered sex offenders from
accessing a wide swath of social-network Internet sites.12 North Carolina used this
law to prosecute and convict Lester Packingham, a registered sex offender who
posted a Facebook message praising God and thanking Jesus for the dismissal of a
traffic ticket.13
Authoring the Court’s opinion in Packingham’s favor, Justice Kennedy extolled
the virtues of the Internet and online social networks as vital modes of modern
communication.14 He also lambasted the Tar Heel State statute for being “unprece-
dented in the scope of First Amendment speech it burdens.”15 As with Tam,
Packingham was decided without dissent.16
Several months before the Court’s June 2017 rulings in Tam and Packingham, it
held in Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman17 that New York’s anti-surcharge,
credit-card statute18 regulated the speech of business merchants, not simply eco-
nomic conduct.19 The statute provides that “[n]o seller in any sales transaction may
impose a surcharge on a holder who elects to use a credit card in lieu of payment by
cash, check, or similar means.”20
Although not deciding whether this law violates the First Amendment—the
Court remanded the case to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit to
resolve that question21—the decision was nonetheless a free-speech victory. Why?
Because the Second Circuit previously had concluded the statute, at least as applied
to single-sticker price frameworks, “regulates conduct, not speech.”22 In accord with
11 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017).
12 See generally id.; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-202.5 (2017) (making it unlawful for a registered
sex offender “to access a commercial social networking Web site where the sex offender
knows that the site permits minor children to become members or to create or maintain personal
Web pages on the commercial social networking Web site”), declared unconstitutional by
Packingham, 137 S. Ct. 1730.
13 Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1734–35.
14 See id. at 1735 (“While in the past there may have been difficulty in identifying the most
important places (in a spatial sense) for the exchange of views, today the answer is clear. It
is cyberspace—the ‘vast democratic forums of the Internet’ in general, and social media in par-
ticular.” (internal citation omitted) (quoting Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997))).
15 Id. at 1737.
16 See generally id.
17 137 S. Ct. 1144 (2017).
18 N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 518 (McKinney 2017).
19 See Expressions Hair Design, 137 S. Ct. at 1151 (“In regulating the communication
of prices rather than prices themselves, § 518 regulates speech.”).
20 N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 518.
21 Expressions Hair Design, 137 S. Ct. at 1151.
22 Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 808 F.3d 118, 135 (2d Cir. 2015), vacated,
137 S. Ct. 1144 (2017). In December 2017, the Second Circuit certified the following ques-
tion to the New York Court of Appeals: “Does a merchant comply with New York’s General
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the results in both Tam and Packingham, the Supreme Court’s March 2017 ruling
in Expressions Hair Design came without dissent.23
The positive impact of Expressions Hair Design’s holding that New York’s
statute raised First Amendment–based speech concerns came swiftly. Specifically,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held in 2016 that a similar Texas law
“regulates conduct, not speech, and, therefore, does not implicate the First Amend-
ment.”24 In April 2017, however, the Supreme Court vacated the Fifth Circuit’s
decision in light of Expressions Hair Design and remanded the case to that court.25
In May 2017, the Fifth Circuit then remanded it to a “district court for further
proceedings consistent with Expressions Hair Design.”26
If one were writing headlines for these cases for a law-centric newspaper, they
might read—from Tam to Packingham to Expressions Hair Design, respectively—
something akin to:
• “Court Reaffirms Right to Offend, Blasts Viewpoint Censorship.”27
• “Court Reinforces Requirement of Narrowly Tailoring Statutes.”28
• “First Amendment Triggered by Economic Statutes Affecting Speech.”29
Business Law § 518 so long as the merchant posts the total-dollars-and-cents price charged
to credit card users?” Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 877 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir.
2017). In January 2018, the New York Court of Appeals accepted the Second Circuit’s certifi-
cation of this question in an unpublished opinion, noting that “the issues presented are to be
considered after briefing and argument.” Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 30 N.Y.3d
1051, 1052 (Jan. 11, 2018).
23 See generally Expressions Hair Design, 137 S. Ct. 1144.
24 Rowell v. Pettijohn, 816 F.3d 73, 80 (5th Cir. 2016), vacated, 137 S. Ct. 1431 (2017).
25 Rowell v. Pettijohn, 137 S. Ct. 1431 (2017).
26 Rowell v. Pettijohn, 865 F.3d 237, 238 (5th Cir. 2017).
27 Actual newspaper headlines for Tam tended to focus on either the trademark aspect of
the case or the decision’s effect on the dispute over trademark registration for the name of
the Washington Redskins football team. See, e.g., Robert Barnes, Trademark Ruling Boosts
Redskins’ Defense of Name, WASH. POST, June 20, 2017, at A1; Brent Kendall, Supreme
Court Rejects Curbs on Trademarks, WALL ST. J., June 20, 2017, at A2; Adam Liptak, Law
Barring Disparaging Trademarks Is Rejected in a Unanimous Decision, N.Y. TIMES, June 20,
2017, at A14; Richard Wolf, First Amendment Protects Offensive Trademarks, USA TODAY,
June 20, 2017, at 8A.
28 Actual newspaper headlines for Packingham generally focused on the First Amendment
speech rights of sex offenders. See, e.g., Opinion, Free Speech for Sex Offenders, WALL ST.
J., June 21, 2017, at A16; Richard Wolf, Ruling: Sex Offenders Can Access Social Sites, USA
TODAY, June 20, 2017, at 8A.
29 Actual newspaper headlines for Expressions Hair Design typically centered on sur-
charges and/or credit cards. See, e.g., Lawrence Hurley, Supreme Court Tosses Ruling that
Upheld N.Y. Credit Card Purchases Law, WASH. POST, Mar. 30, 2017, at A2; Brent Kendall,
Top Court Remands Surcharge Case, WALL ST. J., Mar. 30, 2017, at B10; Adam Liptak,
Justices Say Free Speech Applies in Card Fee Case, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2017, at B2;
David G. Savage, Court Weighs In on Credit Card Fees, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2017, at C2.
2018] BEYOND HEADLINES & HOLDINGS 903
This Article digs behind the headlines and holdings to examine other features
of the high court’s rulings affecting free expression during the first half of 2017.
Some of the items analyzed here cut across the Court’s decisions while others reside
more narrowly within individual cases. In brief, this Article does not purport to
provide a comprehensive analysis of each decision, but rather focuses on perhaps
subtler and sometimes deeper outcomes.
Part I examines Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in the threats-of-violence case
of Perez v. Florida.30 Part II then analyzes the fracturing among the Justices in Tam,
Packingham, and Expressions Hair Design.31 Next, Part III delves into Justice
Kennedy’s dicta in Packingham regarding online social networks and illustrates how
his words already are influencing a raft of cases asserting a First Amendment right
of access to the social media accounts of government officials, including President
Donald J. Trump.32 Part IV explores the different conceptions of viewpoint discrimi-
nation articulated by Justices Alito and Kennedy in Tam, as well as the impact of
labeling a statute viewpoint based.33 Finally, the Article concludes by highlighting
other important facets of the cases, as well as contending that the lack of unanimity
across all of the cases from the first half of 2017 suggests trouble ahead in free-
speech cases.34 The order in which the topics are addressed does not necessarily
reflect their importance.
I. NUDGING FORWARD THE TRUE THREATS DOCTRINE: A CALL FOR RESOLVING
THE QUESTION OF INTENT & ACKNOWLEDGING THE DANGERS OF AVOIDANCE
The true-threats aspect of the Court’s rulings from the first half of 2017 stems not
from Tam, Packingham, or Expressions Hair Design. Instead, it arises from an easy-
to-overlook March 2017 case called Perez v. Florida.35 The Court in Perez denied a
petition for a writ of certiorari to consider a Florida appellate court ruling36 upholding
Robert Perez’s conviction for violating a state statute prohibiting threats of violence.37
True threats are one of the few categories of speech not protected by the First
Amendment.38 In 2003, the Supreme Court defined true threats as “statements where
30 137 S. Ct. 853 (2017); see discussion infra Part I.
31 See discussion infra Part II.
32 See discussion infra Part III.
33 See discussion infra Part IV.
34 See discussion infra Conclusion.
35 Perez, 137 S. Ct. 853.
36 Perez v. State, 189 So. 3d 797 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016) (per curiam), cert. denied, 137
S. Ct. 853 (2017).
37 137 S. Ct. at 853; see also FLA. STAT. § 790.162 (2017) (making it a second-degree
felony “to threaten to throw, project, place, or discharge any destructive device with intent
to do bodily harm to any person or with intent to do damage to any property of any person”).
38 See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717 (2012) (plurality opinion) (identify-
ing “true threats” as one of several categories of unprotected speech); Watts v. United States, 394
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the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an
act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.”39 The
problem, however, was that “the Court declined to lay out what standard of intent
was required to sustain a true threat conviction.”40
What makes fascinating the Court’s decision not to hear Perez is Justice
Sotomayor’s solo concurrence.41 Specifically, she asserted “that to sustain a threat
conviction without encroaching upon the First Amendment, States must prove more
than the mere utterance of threatening words—some level of intent is required.”42
Furthermore, Sotomayor called on her fellow justices to “decide precisely what level
of intent suffices under the First Amendment.”43
This is significant because the Court had a prime opportunity in 2015 in Elonis
v. United States44 to resolve whether a speaker must subjectively intend to communi-
cate a threat in order for the speech to fall outside the bounds of First Amendment
protection.45 The Court, however, squandered that chance in Elonis. It resolved the
case on federal statutory grounds,46 thereby rendering it “not necessary to consider
any First Amendment issues.”47 The outcome in Elonis thus fits snuggly within the
traditions of constitutional avoidance and minimalism often embraced by the Court
under Chief Justice John Roberts’s leadership.48
U.S. 705, 707 (1969) (per curiam) (“What is a threat must be distinguished from what is con-
stitutionally protected speech.”).
39 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003).
40 Jing Xun Quek, Elonis v. United States: The Next Twelve Years, 31 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1109, 1114 (2016).
41 Perez, 137 S. Ct. at 853 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari).
42 Id. at 855.
43 Id.
44 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015).
45 The question presented to the Court in the Elonis petition was:
Whether, consistent with the First Amendment and Virginia v. Black,
538 U.S. 343 (2003), conviction of threatening another person requires
proof of the defendant’s subjective intent to threaten, as required by the
Ninth Circuit and the supreme courts of Massachusetts, Rhode Island,
and Vermont; or whether it is enough to show that a “reasonable person”
would regard the statement as threatening, as held by other federal courts
of appeals and state courts of last resort.
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at I, Elonis, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (No. 13-983).
46 The statute at issue was 18 U.S.C. § 875(c). It provides that “[w]hoever transmits in
interstate or foreign commerce any communication containing any threat to kidnap any person
or any threat to injure the person of another, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than five years, or both.” Id.
47 Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2012.
48 See Clay Calvert & Matthew D. Bunker, Fissures, Fractures & Doctrinal Drifts: Paying
the Price in First Amendment Jurisprudence for a Half Decade of Avoidance, Minimalism &
Partisanship, 24 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 943, 943–46 (2016) (addressing the Court’s avoid-
ance of the First Amendment issue in Elonis).
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Specifically, it comports with Justice Louis Brandeis’s observation more than
eighty years ago that “if a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one involv-
ing a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory construction or general
law, the Court will decide only the latter.”49 Brandeis added that “[t]he Court will
not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record,
if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed
of.”50 This sometimes is called the last resort rule,51 one component of a larger
avoidance canon52 that “encompasses a range of different practices.”53
Yet avoidance in Elonis proved problematic. Professor Joseph Russomanno
points out that the true threats doctrine is “marked by murky definitions and haphaz-
ard application.”54 Indeed, as UCLA Professor Eugene Volokh wrote subsequent to
Elonis, “the Court hasn’t even resolved whether statements are punishable only (a)
if the speaker intends to put a person in fear, or whether it is enough that (b) a
reasonable speaker would realize that the statement would put a person in fear.”55
Due to the Court’s sidestepping of the First Amendment issue in Elonis, Volokh
adds that “[t]he circuit split on the constitutional mens rea question—what is the
minimum mens rea that the First Amendment requires for a threat conviction?—thus
remains unresolved.”56 “Mens rea” is “the Latin phrase for a guilty mind.”57
Perez thus gave the Court another opportunity in 2017 to clarify this matter.
With the Court denying certiorari, however, Justice Sotomayor seemed intent to
illustrate why the Court’s continuing failure to explicate the precise contours of the
49 Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
50 Id.
51 Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding Constitutional Questions, 35 B.C. L. REV. 1003, 1004
(1994).
52 Broadly put, the avoidance canon, as a rule of statutory interpretation, “encourages a
court to adopt one of several plausible interpretations of a statute in order to avoid deciding
a tough constitutional question.” Richard L. Hasen, Constitutional Avoidance and Anti-
Avoidance by the Roberts Court, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 181, 181–82 (2010). The avoidance
canon represents “a form of judicial restraint that avoids unnecessary constitutional decisions
and, as a result, confrontations between the courts and the political branches.” Ernest A. Young,
Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation of Judicial Review, 78
TEX. L. REV. 1549, 1573 (2000). A complete discussion of all facets of the avoidance canon is
beyond the scope of this Article.
53 Neal Kumar Katyal & Thomas P. Schmidt, Active Avoidance: The Modern Supreme
Court and Legal Change, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2109, 2115 (2015).
54 Joseph Russomanno, Facebook Threats: The Missed Opportunities of Elonis v. United
States, 21 COMM. L. & POL’Y 1, 3 (2016).
55 Eugene Volokh, The “Speech Integral to Criminal Conduct” Exception, 101 CORNELL
L. REV. 981, 1005 (2016).
56 Id. at 1005 n.141.
57 John Villasenor, Technology and the Role of Intent in Constitutionally Protected Ex-
pression, 39 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 631, 642 (2016).
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mens rea requirement within the true threats doctrine is troublesome.58 Specifically,
she highlighted the real-world consequences and human toll wrought by constitu-
tional avoidance and minimalism.59
Delving into the facts of the case, Sotomayor began by bluntly asserting that
“Robert Perez is serving more than 15 years in a Florida prison for what may have
been nothing more than a drunken joke.”60 Perez was inebriated when he made what
Sotomayor called an “apparent joke”61 to a liquor store employee who misinter-
preted Perez’s use of the phrase “Molly cocktail”—a drink combining vodka with
grapefruit juice that Perez had just been drinking at a nearby beach—with a Molotov
cocktail.62 A Molotov cocktail, sometimes referred to as a petrol bomb, is an inexpen-
sive, homemade weapon that today is classified as an improvised explosive device.63
Perez thereafter proclaimed, “I’m going to blow up this whole [expletive] world.”64
He was prosecuted under a Florida statute65 for threatening to blow up the liquor
store.66 The jury, as Sotomayor explained, was given an instruction that permitted
it “to convict Perez based on what he ‘stated’ alone—irrespective of whether his
words represented a joke, the ramblings of an intoxicated individual, or a credible
threat.”67 He was convicted and sentenced to fifteen years plus one day in prison.68
Sotomayor was disturbed by this seemingly unjust outcome. She opined that
“the jury instruction—and Perez’s conviction—raise serious First Amendment
concerns worthy of this Court’s review.”69 Citing the sentencing transcript,
Sotomayor pointed out that even “the prosecutor acknowledged that Perez may have
been ‘just a harmless drunk guy at the beach.’”70 Beyond the instructions failing to
consider Perez’s intent, she was also troubled because they did not require jurors to
58 See generally Perez v. Florida, 137 S. Ct. 853, 853 (2017) (Sotomayor, J., concurring
in the denial of certiorari).
59 See id. at 853–55 (stating how the harmless ramblings of a drunk guy at a beach could
lead to a fifteen-year prison sentence without the state having proved mens rea).
60 Id. at 853.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Carlos Martín-Alberca et al., Anionic Markers for the Forensic Identification of Chemical
Ignition Molotov Cocktail Composition, 53 SCI. & JUST. 49, 49 (2013). The Molotov cocktail
takes its name from Soviet Union politician Vyacheslav Molotov and was coined by the Finns
when fighting against the Soviets during the Winter War of 1939–1940. Jon Guttman, Hand
Tool: Molotov Cocktail—One Drink Soldiers Would Always Rather Send Back, MIL. HIST.,
July/Aug. 2007, at 21.
64 Perez, 137 S. Ct. at 853 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari) (altera-
tion in original).
65 FLA. STAT. § 790.162 (2017).
66 Perez, 137 S. Ct. at 853 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari).
67 Id. at 854.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 855 (citation omitted).
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consider the context surrounding Perez’s statements.71 Sotomayor asserted that
“[c]ontext in this case might have made a difference.”72
Sotomayor made it evident she believes the Supreme Court’s true threats
decisions in Watts v. United States73 and Virginia v. Black74 collectively stand for
the proposition
that to sustain a threat conviction without encroaching upon the
First Amendment, States must prove more than the mere utterance
of threatening words—some level of intent is required. And these
two cases strongly suggest that it is not enough that a reasonable
person might have understood the words as a threat—a jury must
find that the speaker actually intended to convey a threat.75
She concluded that “[t]he Court should also decide precisely what level of intent
suffices under the First Amendment—a question we avoided two Terms ago in
Elonis.”76 Ultimately, Sotomayor only agreed with the Court’s refusal to hear the
case because the lower courts never addressed the First Amendment issue.77
All of this is significant for two reasons. First and foremost, Sotomayor’s con-
currence demonstrates the dire consequences that the Court’s penchant for avoid-
ance and minimalism can have on individuals like Robert Perez.78 Had the Court in
Elonis addressed the First Amendment question and had it, in turn, embraced a
subjective intent requirement, then Perez’s conviction would not stand on appeal
because the jury instructions rendered intent irrelevant.79 Incarceration of fifteen
years is a steep price to pay for what may have been a drunken joke lost in transla-
tion. While the last resort rule may be a well-established facet of constitutional avoid-
ance, it also can leave in its wake the wrecked lives of individuals like Robert Perez.
Additionally, Sotomayor’s concurrence is important because she makes it clear
she believes not only that “some level of intent is required”80 under the true threats
doctrine, but more specifically that Watts and Black “strongly suggest”81 a speaker
must have “actually intended to convey a threat” for the speech to fall outside the
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (per curiam).
74 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
75 Perez, 137 S. Ct. at 855 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari) (emphasis
added to “actually intended,” emphasis in original for “some”).
76 Id.
77 Id. at 854.
78 Id. at 855 (indicating that context made all the difference for Perez’s conviction).
79 Id. (“[T]he jury was directed to convict solely on the basis of what Perez ‘stated.’”).
80 Id.
81 Id.
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ambit of First Amendment protection.82 This position seemingly puts Sotomayor at
odds with the views expressed by both Justices Alito and Thomas in Elonis.83
In Elonis, Alito penned an opinion concurring and dissenting in part with the
Court’s opinion delivered by Chief Justice Roberts.84 In the process, Alito rejected
defendant Anthony Elonis’s contention that the First Amendment requires some-
thing more than just recklessness on the part of the speaker.85 Alito explained that
“whether or not the person making a threat intends to cause harm, the damage is the
same.”86 In other words, the harm that justifies suppressing true threats arises re-
gardless of a speaker’s intent. Thus, for Alito, all that the First Amendment requires
for a true threat to fall outside its scope of protection is for a speaker to act—akin
to the second prong of the actual malice standard in libel law87—with reckless
disregard of putting a victim in fear of violence.88 Recklessness lies just “[o]ne step
above negligence on the hierarchy of criminal culpability.”89
Justice Thomas dissented in Elonis.90 In contrast to Justice Sotomayor’s inter-
pretation of Watts and Black, Thomas wrote that “[n]either of those decisions . . .
addresses whether the First Amendment requires a particular mental state for threat
prosecutions.”91 Furthermore, Thomas emphasized that other categories of unpro-
tected speech do not include a specific intent component.92 For example, he pointed
out that fighting words may exist “without proof of an intent to provoke a violent
reaction.”93 Thomas thus saw no reason “why we should give threats pride of place
among unprotected speech.”94
82 Id. (emphasis added).
83 Compare Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2014–16 (2015) (Alito, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part) (“In my view, the term ‘threat’ in § 875(c) can fairly
be defined as a statement that . . . was at least reckless . . . .”), and id. at 2018 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (“[T]he Court of Appeals properly applied the general-intent standard . . . .”), with
Perez, 137 S. Ct. at 855 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari) (“[A] jury must
find that the speaker actually intended to convey a threat.” (emphasis added)).
84 Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2013–18 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
85 Id. at 2016.
86 Id.
87 See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964) (defining actual malice
as a statement published “with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not”).
88 Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2017 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
89 Enrique A. Monagas & Carlos E. Monagas, Prosecuting Threats in the Age of Social
Media, 36 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 57, 75 (2016).
90 Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2018–28 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
91 Id. at 2026.
92 See id. at 2027 (“We generally have not required a heightened mental state under the
First Amendment for historically unprotected categories of speech.”).
93 Id.
94 Id. at 2028.
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If the Court heeds Justice Sotomayor’s call in Perez to resolve the intent
quagmire plaguing the true threats doctrine, then it appears the justices may fracture
on what constitutes the correct standard. Sotomayor’s sentiment in Perez seemingly
diverges from those of both Alito and Thomas in Elonis.95
Ultimately, Sotomayor’s lone concurrence in Perez exposing the underlying
facts of the case and venting her worry over whether the outcome was unjust is
unsurprising. That’s because the case lies at the intersection of the First Amendment
freedom of speech and the criminal justice system.96 As Rachel Barkow astutely
wrote in 2014, Sotomayor is “a powerful voice in criminal law cases”97 whose view
“is firmly grounded in how things actually work in practice, and she pays close
attention to the specific facts of cases before her. Her experience as an assistant
district attorney and trial judge also seems to have made her attuned to the need for
checks on government power.”98
Writing in 2016, New York Times Supreme Court reporter Adam Liptak ob-
served that “[m]ost of the justices, including some of its more liberal members, are
inclined to give the police the benefit of the doubt. Justice Sotomayor is more apt
to see encounters with the police through the eyes of the powerless, as tinged with
humiliation, danger and worse.”99 That was the situation with her “fierce and per-
sonal dissent”100 in 2016 in the Fourth Amendment stop-and-frisk case of Utah v.
Strieff,101 and it certainly was reflected again in Sotomayor’s 2017 analysis of the
facts in Perez.102 Her dissent in Strieff made evident, as Professor Josephine Ross
notes, that “Sotomayor wants her fellow Justices to understand the real-life conse-
quences of relaxing Fourth Amendment protections.”103 Her concurrence in Perez,
95 See supra notes 60–94 and accompanying text.
96 See supra notes 60–83 and accompanying text.
97 Rachel E. Barkow, Justice Sotomayor and Criminal Justice in the Real World, 123
YALE L.J. F. 409, 411 (2014), https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/justice-sotomayor-and
-criminal-justice-in-the-real-world [https://perma.cc/Z8UZ-WTZX].
98 Id. at 410.
99 Adam Liptak, Sotomayor, in Dissents, Tackles Criminal Justice, N.Y. TIMES, July 5,
2016, at A11.
100 Robert Barnes, Fierce Dissent Over Illegal Police Stop, WASH. POST, June 21, 2016,
at A3.
101 See 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2064–71 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). In Strieff, Sotomayor
observed, among other things, that “it is no secret that people of color are disproportionate
victims” of police stops and interrogations. Id. at 2070. She added that:
For generations, black and brown parents have given their children “the
talk”—instructing them never to run down the street; always keep your
hands where they can be seen; do not even think of talking back to a
stranger—all out of fear of how an officer with a gun will react to them.
Id.
102 See Perez v. Florida, 137 S. Ct. 853, 853–55 (2017) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the
denial of certiorari).
103 Josephine Ross, Warning: Stop-and-Frisk May Be Hazardous to Your Health, 25 WM.
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 689, 710 (2016).
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in turn, suggests she also wants her colleagues to recognize the real-life implications
of repeatedly avoiding the intent question in true threats cases.104 The fifteen-year
incarceration of a drunken man who may only have been joking is, indeed, no
laughing matter.
II. UNITED BUT DIVIDED: A LACK OF UNANIMITY CLOUDS THE FIRST AMENDMENT
This facet of division among the justices cuts across the Court’s rulings in Tam,
Packingham, and Expressions Hair Design. All three decisions were free-speech
victories and none had a dissent, but not one was unanimous.105 As discussed later,106
the rifts among the justices could cloud future First Amendment cases.
A. Matal v. Tam
Tam involved three opinions. They were authored by Justices Alito,107 Kennedy,108
and Thomas.109 Most significantly, there was no five-Justice majority when it came to
applying two important doctrines—viewpoint discrimination and commercial speech.110
Regarding viewpoint discrimination, Justice Alito authored a section of the
opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Thomas and Breyer.111 Alito,
however, only cursorily addressed viewpoint discrimination, devoting a mere two
paragraphs to it.112 In contrast, Justice Kennedy offered a much lengthier and more
robust analysis in a concurrence joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan.113
As described in Part IV, the Kennedy bloc also embraced a cleaner, textbook-like
understanding of viewpoint discrimination and, in turn, treated it as fatal for statutes
embodying it.114 Thus, while all eight justices concluded the disparagement clause
was viewpoint based, they divided four-to-four on their analysis of that key issue.115
104 Perez, 137 S. Ct. at 853–54 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari).
105 See supra Introduction (describing the outcomes in Tam, Packingham, and Expressions
Hair Design).
106 See infra Part IV (exploring in greater detail the cleft on viewpoint discrimination in Tam).
107 Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1751–65 (2017).
108 Id. at 1765–69 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
109 Id. at 1769 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
110 See generally id. at 1760–63 (plurality opinion) (discussing viewpoint discrimination;
joined by the Chief Justice, Justice Thomas, and Justice Breyer).
111 See id. at 1763 (addressing viewpoint discrimination).
112 Id.
113 Id. at 1765–69 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (addres-
sing viewpoint discrimination).
114 See infra notes 313–21, 323–24 and accompanying text.
115 Justice Alito, joined by Roberts, Breyer, and Thomas, wrote that the disparagement
clause “denies registration to any mark that is offensive to a substantial percentage of the
members of any group. . . . [T]hat is viewpoint discrimination: Giving offense is a viewpoint.”
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On the commercial speech front, the Tam justices splintered three ways. Thomas
penned a lone concurrence.116 He reiterated his belief117 that statutes targeting com-
mercial speech should be measured against strict scrutiny.118 Regulations of commer-
cial speech today are generally evaluated under an intermediate scrutiny standard119
established more than thirty-five years ago in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp.
v. Public Service Commission.120 Thomas was the only Justice in Tam to argue that
commercial speech regulations should always be subject to strict scrutiny.121
Justice Alito, again joined by Roberts, Thomas,122 and Breyer, wrote a portion
of Tam analyzing the disparagement clause under the intermediate scrutiny standard
used in commercial speech cases and holding it could not survive that analysis.123
Conversely, Justice Kennedy, along with Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, rea-
soned that the “viewpoint based discrimination at issue here necessarily invokes
Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1763 (plurality opinion). Justice Kennedy, along with Ginsburg, Sotomayor,
and Kagan, reasoned that the clause “constitutes viewpoint discrimination—a form of speech
suppression so potent that it must be subject to rigorous constitutional scrutiny. The Govern-
ment’s action and the statute on which it is based cannot survive this scrutiny.” Id. at 1765
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
116 Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1769 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
117 See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 572 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment) (opining that “I continue to believe that when the
government seeks to restrict truthful speech in order to suppress the ideas it conveys, strict
scrutiny is appropriate, whether or not the speech in question may be characterized as ‘com-
mercial’” (citation omitted)); see also Amanda Shanor, The New Lochner, 2016 WIS. L. REV.
133, 149 (“Justice Thomas has authored a number of separate opinions in recent years calling
for commercial speech to be treated on par with political speech.”).
118 See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2231 (2015) (observing that “content-
based restrictions on speech” are permissible “only if they survive strict scrutiny,” and noting
that strict scrutiny requires a compelling government interest and a statute that is narrowly
tailored to serve that interest); United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813
(2000) (“If a statute regulates speech based on its content, it must be narrowly tailored to pro-
mote a compelling Government interest.”).
119 See Caroline Mala Corbin, Compelled Disclosures, 65 ALA. L. REV. 1277, 1283 (2014)
(noting that “the Supreme Court differentiates between commercial speech (such as advertising)
and noncommercial speech, and subjects the former to intermediate scrutiny”).
120 447 U.S. 557 (1980); see Lili Levi, A “Faustian Pact”? Native Advertising and the
Future of the Press, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 647, 681 n.172 (2015) (noting that in Central Hudson the
Court articulated “a four-pronged standard of intermediate scrutiny for commercial speech”).
121 See generally Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1769 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment).
122 Although Thomas argued in his concurrence that strict scrutiny should apply in com-
mercial speech cases, he nonetheless joined Justice Alito’s opinion determining that the
disparagement clause could not pass muster “even under the less stringent test announced
in Central Hudson.” Id.
123 Id. at 1763–65 (plurality opinion).
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heightened scrutiny”124 even if the speech is commercial.125 In other words, while
the Alito bloc was content applying intermediate scrutiny, Kennedy’s cohort felt that
standard was insufficient due to the viewpoint nature of the disparagement clause.
When Thomas’s call for commercial speech cases to be considered under strict
scrutiny is coupled with Kennedy’s four-justice concurrence arguing for deployment
of “heightened scrutiny,”126 it means a majority of the Tam justices believed inter-
mediate scrutiny was the wrong test to apply to the disparagement clause. This
doctrinal schism could haunt the Court in future commercial speech cases.
B. Packingham v. North Carolina
In addition to fracturing in Tam, the Justices divided in Packingham in strik-
ingly similar blocs. Specifically, Justice Kennedy wrote the Court’s opinion and was
joined, exactly as he was in Tam, by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan.127
In addition, Justice Breyer partnered with Kennedy’s opinion.128 Justice Alito au-
thored a concurrence and was joined, as he was in Tam, by Roberts and Thomas.129
In other words, only Breyer changed his alignment in Packingham when compared
with Tam. Thus, while all of the justices agreed North Carolina’s statute restricting
registered sex offenders’ access to social media websites was unconstitutional for
being too broadly drafted,130 they failed to unite around a single opinion.
In contrast to Tam, however, the fissure between the Kennedy and Alito blocs
in Packingham was not doctrinal. Instead, it pivoted on dicta.131 Specifically, Alito
criticized Kennedy for “undisciplined dicta” and “musings”132 extolling the virtues
of the Internet and online social networks as high-tech avenues for dialogue and
discourse akin to traditional public fora such as parks and streets.133
124 Id. at 1767 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
125 See id. (“Unlike content based discrimination, discrimination based on viewpoint, in-
cluding a regulation that targets speech for its offensiveness, remains of serious concern in
the commercial context.”).
126 See id.
127 Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1733–38 (2017).
128 Id.
129 Id. at 1738–44 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
130 See id. at 1730–44 (majority opinion and Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice
Kennedy deemed the statute “unprecedented in the scope of First Amendment speech it
burdens.” Id. at 1737 (majority opinion). Similarly, Justice Alito lamented its “extraordinary
breadth.” Id. at 1738 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). Alito added that the statute
“sweeps far too broadly to satisfy the demands of the Free Speech Clause.” Id. at 1743.
131 Dicta, the plural of dictum, generally refers to “expressions in an opinion of the court
which are not necessary to support the decision.” Dicta, BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY
(3d ed. 1969).
132 Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1738 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
133 Kennedy noted that streets and parks are “quintessential” public fora for exercising
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Kennedy, for instance, wrote in Packingham that it “is clear”134 today that
“cyberspace [generally] and social media in particular”135 are “the most important
places . . . for the exchange of views.”136 He pointed out the inexpensive, cost-
efficient nature of communicating on social networks and emphasized that many
government officials now have social media accounts that allow citizens to “petition
their elected representatives and otherwise engage with them in a direct manner.”137
In other words, two First Amendment rights are at stake when it comes to social
media—not simply free speech, but also the right “to petition the government for a
redress of grievances.”138 It was as if Kennedy was channeling his inner Alexander
Meiklejohn, substituting online social networks in place of the famed First Amend-
ment theorist’s “town meeting [where] the people of a community assemble to
discuss and to act upon matters of public interest.”139
Kennedy zeroed in on the importance of citizens possessing access to Internet-
based venues for expression.140 He remarked that “[a] fundamental principle of the
First Amendment is that all persons have access to places where they can speak and
listen, and then, after reflection, speak and listen once more.”141 The Court therefore
“must exercise extreme caution” when limiting First Amendment protection “for
access to vast networks” on the Internet.142
Alito felt these pronouncements were simply over the top and unnecessary to
reach the conclusion that the North Carolina statute was overbroad.143 Alito ex-
plained he was
troubled by the Court’s loose rhetoric. After noting that “a street or
a park is a quintessential forum for the exercise of First Amend-
ment rights,” the Court states that “cyberspace” and “social
media in particular” are now “the most important places (in a
spatial sense) for the exchange of views.” The Court declines to
explain what this means with respect to free speech law . . . .144
speech rights and that they remain “essential venues” today. Id. at 1735 (majority opinion).
He stressed, however, that “the most important places . . . today” for expression are the Internet
and, in particular, “social media.” Id.
134 Id.
135 Id. (internal citation omitted).
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
139 ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT
22 (1948).
140 See Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1735–36.
141 Id. at 1735.
142 Id. at 1736.
143 See id. at 1743 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
144 Id. (internal citation omitted).
914 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 26:899
Alito fretted about how lower courts will use Kennedy’s dicta glorifying online
social networks.145 Alito contended that Kennedy’s “unnecessary rhetoric”146 might
“be interpreted by some to mean that the States are largely powerless to restrict even
the most dangerous sexual predators from visiting any internet sites, including, for
example, teenage dating sites and sites designed to permit minors to discuss personal
problems with their peers.”147 In brief, Alito worried Kennedy’s dicta will blur the
traditional distinction separating a holding from dicta148 by taking on the prece-
dential force of a holding.149
Alito’s concern, however, may be unwarranted. That is because Kennedy wrote
that “this opinion should not be interpreted as barring a State from enacting more
specific laws than the one at issue. Specific criminal acts are not protected speech
even if speech is the means for their commission.”150 Kennedy added that “it can be
assumed that the First Amendment permits a State to enact specific, narrowly tailored
laws that prohibit a sex offender from engaging in conduct that often presages a
sexual crime, like contacting a minor or using a website to gather information about
a minor.”151
Thus, although Alito is correct that Kennedy celebrated the Internet and online
social networks,152 Kennedy also carefully highlighted that states retain power to
restrict sex offenders’ access to websites via more narrowly drafted statutes.153 One
thus speculates whether Alito’s attack on Kennedy’s “loose rhetoric”154 was
launched for other reasons. Perhaps the condemnation simply reflects overarching
differences between the two jurists. To wit, Kennedy typically is the pivotal swing
145 Id. at 1738.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 See Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 953,
1094 (2005) (addressing in detail “the important distinction between holding and dicta”).
149 This blending or merger between dicta and holding is a common concern. As Professor
Stacy Scaldo explains:
Whether highly detailed or overly simplified, finding a consistently
workable definition of dictum is akin to shooting at a moving target.
But the more pertinent question to be addressed is the potential effect
dicta have on future cases. If dictum is not part of the holding of a case,
it should not be binding precedent.
Stacy A. Scaldo, Deadly Dicta: Roe’s “Unwanted Motherhood,” Carhart II’s “Women’s
Regret,” and the Shifting Narrative of Abortion Jurisprudence, 6 DREXEL L. REV. 87, 91 (2013)
(footnote omitted).
150 Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1737 (emphasis added).
151 Id.
152 For instance, Kennedy wrote that “[w]hile in the past there may have been difficulty in
identifying the most important places (in a spatial sense) for the exchange of views, today the
answer is clear. It is cyberspace—the ‘vast democratic forums of the Internet’ in general, and
social media in particular.” Id. at 1735 (quoting Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997)).
153 Id. at 1737.
154 Id. at 1743 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
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vote155 and “one of the Court’s strongest First Amendment advocates.”156 In contrast,
“Alito’s record is the most consistently conservative of any justice on the current
Court”157 and he stands as “the Roberts Court’s most consistent critic of expanding
First Amendment free speech rights.”158
A cynic also might wonder if Alito is taking up the late Justice Antonin Scalia’s
mantle as chief criticizer of Kennedy’s opinions.159 Or possibly that Alito’s brickbats
in Packingham were payback for Kennedy joining the Court’s liberal wing in the
2016 abortion-restriction case of Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt.160 Kennedy’s
vote there fashioned a five-to-three decision striking down a Texas law limiting
access to abortions.161 If, as Dean Erwin Chemerinsky writes, “Kennedy had voted
with Roberts, Thomas, and Alito in Whole Wom[a]n’s Health to uphold the Texas law,
it would have been a 4–4 split and the Texas law would have gone into effect.”162
Ultimately, and regardless of the reason why, it is clear—based on both Tam and
Packingham—that Kennedy and Alito didn’t see eye to eye in First Amendment
155 See Elizabeth Price Foley, Whole Woman’s Health and the Supreme Court’s Kaleido-
scopic Review of Constitutional Rights, 2015–2016 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 153, 169–70 (2016)
(describing Kennedy as “the Court’s current ‘swing’ vote”); Eric J. Segall, Invisible Justices:
How Our Highest Court Hides from the American People, 32 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 787, 829
(2016) (asserting that “it is well accepted that, prior to Justice Scalia’s death, Justice Kennedy
was the all-important swing vote on the Court in most important areas of constitutional law
including abortion and affirmative action”).
156 Samuel P. Siegel, Comment, Reconciling Caperton and Citizens United: When Campaign
Spending Should Compel Recusal of Elected Officials, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1076, 1088 (2012).
157 Tom Donnelly & Brianne Gorod, Conservatism and Samuel Alito’s Tenure on the
Supreme Court, ATLANTIC (Jan. 30, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive
/2016/01/none-to-the-right-of-samuel-alito/431946/ [https://perma.cc/2NSE-VPZQ].
158 Ronald K.L. Collins, Foreword, Exceptional Freedom—The Roberts Court, the First
Amendment, and the New Absolutism, 76 ALB. L. REV. 409, 440 (2013).
159 For example, Justice Scalia savaged Kennedy’s opinion for the Court in the same-sex
marriage case of Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015), as “an opinion lacking even a
thin veneer of law” and replete with “mummeries and straining-to-be-memorable passages.”
Id. at 2628 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia added that Kennedy’s “opinion is couched in a style
that is as pretentious as its content is egotistic. It is one thing for separate concurring or dis-
senting opinions to contain extravagances, even silly extravagances, of thought and expression;
it is something else for the official opinion of the Court to do so.” Id. at 2630.
160 See 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2299 (2016). The Court in Hellerstedt declared that two provisions
of a Texas law affecting the ability of a woman to obtain an abortion were unconstitutional. Id.
at 2300. Justice Kennedy joined the Court’s opinion authored by Justice Breyer and also
joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan. See id. at 2299 (identifying the justices
that joined with Breyer’s opinion for the Court). Justice Alito, in contrast, wrote a lengthy dis-
sent joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas. Id. at 2330–53 (Alito, J., dissenting).
161 Id. at 2300 (majority opinion). The seat on the Court held by the late Justice Antonin
Scalia was still vacant when the Court ruled in Hellerstedt and thus only eight justices
participated in the case. See id. at 2299.
162 Erwin Chemerinsky, Everything Changed: October Term 2015, 19 GREEN BAG 2D
343, 356 (2016).
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cases in 2017.163 Although the pair agreed on the bottom-line results in Tam and
Packingham, their logic and reasoning diverged. Such fissures, be they doctrinal as
in Tam or dicta-centric as in Packingham, could impact future free-speech cases.
C. Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman
Finally, the Court’s March 2017 ruling in Expressions Hair Design v.
Schneiderman featured three separate opinions: (1) the opinion of the Court by Chief
Justice Roberts and joined by Justices Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Kagan;164
(2) a lone concurrence in the judgment by Justice Breyer;165 and (3) a concurrence
in the judgment authored by Justice Sotomayor and joined by Justice Alito.166 Two
opinions—those of Roberts and Breyer—agreed that New York’s anti-surcharge,
credit-card statute raised First Amendment–based free-speech concerns.167
Breyer’s solo concurrence, however, continued what Professor Mark Tushnet
calls the Justice’s “project of partial de-doctrinalization.”168 Indeed, Benjamin
Pomerance points out that Breyer “appears to distrust the Court’s typical strict scrutiny
framework for evaluating freedom of speech cases, including certain disputes where
viewpoint discrimination is at issue. Frequently, he prefers employing a ‘proportional-
ity’ balancing test for the vast majority of cases . . . .”169 Proportionality is embraced
by courts in other nations, but not by the U.S. Supreme Court.170
This absence in United States jurisprudence comes despite Justice Breyer’s
opinions that, in the words of First Amendment attorney Floyd Abrams, “repeatedly
seek to apply the concept of proportionality”171 and that are “closer to those adopted
163 See supra notes 108–62 and accompanying text. Alito and Kennedy were also at log-
gerheads in prior free speech cases. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 730, 739
(2012) (striking down the Stolen Valor Act for violating the First Amendment, and involving
a plurality opinion penned by Justice Kennedy concluding the “Act infringes upon speech
protected by the First Amendment” and a dissent authored by Justice Alito “uphold[ing] the
constitutionality of this valuable law”).
164 See generally 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1146 (2017) (identifying the justices that joined with
Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion for the Court).
165 Id. at 1152 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
166 Id. at 1153 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment).
167 Chief Justice Roberts wrote for the majority that “[i]n regulating the communication
of prices rather than prices themselves, § 518 regulates speech.” Id. at 1151 (majority opin-
ion). Justice Breyer “agree[d] with the Court that New York’s statute regulates speech.” Id.
at 1152 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
168 Mark Tushnet, Justice Breyer and the Partial De-Doctrinalization of Free Speech Law,
128 HARV. L. REV. 508, 514 (2014).
169 Benjamin Pomerance, An Elastic Amendment: Justice Stephen G. Breyer’s Fluid
Conceptions of Freedom of Speech, 79 ALB. L. REV. 403, 506 (2016).
170 Moshe Cohen-Eliya & Iddo Porat, Proportionality and the Culture of Justification, 59
AM. J. COMP. L. 463, 465–66 (2011).
171 Floyd Abrams, Keynote Remarks, Free Speech Under Fire: The Future of the First
Amendment, 25 J.L. & POL’Y 47, 58 (2016).
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in European nations in interpreting their more limited free speech protections under
the European Convention on Human Rights.”172 Indeed, as Professors Vikram David
Amar and Alan Brownstein assert, Breyer writes in cases such as United States v.
Alvarez173 “as if there were no formal free speech doctrine currently in use that
constrains judges’ assessments of free speech claims”174 and embraces a more “free-
form balancing approach.”175
Breyer was true to his doctrine-questioning form in Expressions Hair Design,
attacking the traditional dichotomy between speech and conduct.176 He opined that
“because virtually all government regulation affects speech, . . . it is often wiser not
to try to distinguish between ‘speech’ and ‘conduct.’”177 Breyer wrote that “deter-
mining the proper approach is typically more important than trying to distinguish
‘speech’ from ‘conduct.’”178
Determining which approach is proper, Breyer declared, involves a trio of
considerations.179 First, if a statute “negatively affects the processes through which
172 Id.
173 567 U.S. 709 (2012). In Alvarez, the Court struck down the Stolen Valor Act, which
made it a crime to falsely claim having won a Congressional Medal of Honor. Id. at 730. Jus-
tice Breyer concurred in the judgment, but wrote that “I do not rest my conclusion upon a
strict categorical analysis.” Id. (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). Instead, Breyer
simply considered “whether it is possible substantially to achieve the Government’s objective
in less burdensome ways.” Id. at 737. Reflecting the concept of proportionality, Breyer con-
cluded the Stolen Valor Act was unconstitutional because it “works disproportionate consti-
tutional harm.” Id. at 739.
174 Vikram David Amar & Alan Brownstein, The Voracious First Amendment: Alvarez
and Knox in the Context of 2012 and Beyond, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 491, 497 (2013).
175 Id.
176 See Randall P. Bezanson, Is There Such a Thing as Too Much Free Speech?, 91 OR.
L. REV. 601, 601 (2012) (“From its beginning, the First Amendment speech guarantee has
rested on two fundamental boundaries: speech versus conduct and liberty versus utility.”);
Diahann DaSilva, Playing a “Labeling Game”: Classifying Expression as Conduct as a
Means of Circumventing First Amendment Analysis, 56 B.C. L. REV. 767, 769–70 (2015)
(noting “the speech versus conduct dichotomy” and examining “the distinction between speech
and conduct, the implications of that distinction, and how courts have classified various
activities as speech or conduct”); Paul Sherman, Occupational Speech and the First Amend-
ment, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 183, 188 (2015) (“The notion that there is a distinction between
laws that regulate speech and laws that regulate conduct with merely an incidental effect on
speech is well established.”).
The U.S. Supreme Court recognizes that some types of conduct can rise to the level of
speech for First Amendment purposes under the symbolic speech doctrine. As Justice Sandra
Day O’Connor observed when recognizing cross burning as a form of speech, “[t]he First
Amendment affords protection to symbolic or expressive conduct as well as to actual speech.”
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003).
177 Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1152 (2017) (Breyer, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
178 Id.
179 Id.
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political discourse or public opinion is formed or expressed,”180 then the Court
should “scrutinize that regulation with great care.”181 Importantly, Breyer avoided
using the term strict scrutiny, the traditional doctrinal moniker for the Court’s most
rigorous form of review.182 Second, Breyer asserted that if the “‘informational
function’ provided by truthful commercial speech” is restricted by a statute, then this
triggers “a ‘lesser’ (but still elevated) form of scrutiny.”183 Here, he sidestepped
using the term intermediate scrutiny, the label typically attached to commercial
speech analyses under the test created in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v.
Public Service Commission.184 Third and finally, Breyer contended that regulations
that either compel disclosure of purely factual information in a commercial speech
setting or simply affect regular commercial transactions are subject to rational basis
review.185
In contrast to the opinions of Justices Roberts and Breyer in Expressions Hair
Design, Justice Sotomayor agreed with the majority’s judgment to remand the case
to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, but not for purposes of having
it resolve the statute’s constitutionality.186 Instead, she called for the Second Circuit
to certify the case to New York’s highest appellate court, the New York Court of
Appeals, to resolve the ambiguity of precisely what the statute regulates.187 This was
180 Id.
181 Id.
182 See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 799 (2011) (describing “strict scrutiny”
as “a demanding standard” that requires a statute to be “justified by a compelling government
interest and . . . narrowly drawn to serve that interest”).
183 Expressions Hair Design, 137 S. Ct. at 1152 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
184 447 U.S. 557 (1980); see Robert Post & Amanda Shanor, Adam Smith’s First Amend-
ment, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 165, 173 (2015) (“Beguiled by the abstract generalities of the
Central Hudson test, judges have become captivated by the generic idea of ‘intermediate
scrutiny’ rather than by the specific question of whether government regulations of commercial
speech unduly impair public access to accurate information.” (internal citations omitted));
Sherman, supra note 176, at 198 (describing “the intermediate scrutiny set forth in Central
Hudson Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Service Commission”).
185 Expressions Hair Design, 137 S. Ct. at 1152 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
186 Sotomayor concluded:
“The complexity” of this case “might have been avoided,” had the Second
Circuit certified the question of § 518’s meaning when the case was
first before it. The Court’s opinion does not foreclose the Second Circuit
from choosing that route on remand. But rather than contributing to the
piecemeal resolution of this case, I would vacate the judgment below
and remand with instructions to certify the case to the New York Court
of Appeals to allow it to definitively interpret § 518. I thus concur only
in the judgment.
Id. at 1159 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Arizonans for Official English
v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 79 (1997)).
187 Id.
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necessary, Sotomayor averred, because the statute, given what she called its “elusive
nature,”188 is subject “to at least three interpretations.”189
The problem of interpretation was compounded because the Second Circuit had
only ruled on one possible meaning of the statute—namely, that it applied to single-
sticker pricing schemes “where merchants post one price and would like to charge
more to customers who pay by credit card.”190 Under that interpretation, the Second
Circuit held that the statute “does not regulate speech.”191 This, in turn, was the only
interpretation of the statute the U.S. Supreme Court considered.192
Problematically, the Second Circuit punted on whether the New York statute also
raised First Amendment concerns as applied to two-sticker price schemes.193 As Chief
Justice Roberts noted for the majority, “the Court of Appeals abstained from reaching
the merits of the constitutional question beyond the single-sticker context.”194
Sotomayor was unsatisfied by the Second Circuit’s “partial decision,”195 blasting
it as “neither required nor right.”196 Rather than abstaining from issues beyond the
single-sticker context, “[t]he Second Circuit should have exercised its discretion to
certify the antecedent state-law question here: What pricing schemes or pricing
displays does § 518 prohibit? Certification might have avoided the need for a con-
stitutional ruling altogether.”197 Sotomayor went so far as to accuse the Second
Circuit of committing “an abuse of discretion” when it failed to certify the question
regarding the meaning of the statute to the New York Court of Appeals “because
[the Second Circuit] viewed the ‘state of the record’ as too underdeveloped.”198 This
was a mistake, Sotomayor asserted, because the meaning of the statute and whether
it violates the First Amendment “are pure questions of law” not dependent on an
extensive factual record.199
188 Id. at 1155.
189 Id. at 1154.
190 Id. at 1148 (majority opinion).
191 Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 808 F.3d 118, 130 n.7 (2d Cir. 2015), vacated,
137 S. Ct. 1144 (2017).
192 As Chief Justice Roberts wrote for the Court, “[W]e limit our consideration to the single-
sticker pricing regime for present purposes.” Expressions Hair Design, 137 S. Ct. at 1149 n.1.
193 The Second Circuit opined:
We now turn to the balance of Plaintiffs’ First Amendment challenge,
which is premised on the assumption that Section 518 applies to sellers
who do not post single sticker prices. Because this portion of Plaintiffs’
challenge turns on an unsettled question of state law, we do not reach
the merits.
Expressions Hair Design, 808 F.3d at 135.
194 Expressions Hair Design, 137 S. Ct. at 1148–49.
195 Id. at 1156 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment).
196 Id.
197 Id. at 1158.
198 Id. (quoting Expressions Hair Design, 808 F.3d at 141).
199 Id.
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Sotomayor also jabbed at the Court’s opinion written by Roberts. “The Court
addresses only one part of one half of petitioners’ First Amendment challenge to the
New York statute at issue here. This quarter-loaf outcome is worse than none,” she
opined.200 Perhaps more charitably put, the outcome in Expressions Hair Design can
be dubbed “minimalist.”201
To a large extent, this objection taps into Sotomayor’s concerns expressed in
Perez regarding the Court’s Elonis decision regarding true threats addressed earlier.202
Elonis, to continue the bread analogy, can also be considered quarter-loaf. Why?
Because the Elonis Court only addressed the federal statutory issue, not the First
Amendment one, and still then only held on the statutory issue that something more
than a reasonable-person, negligence standard was required by the statute, failing
to specify precisely what the proper mens rea level is.203 Suffice it to say, when
reading her opinions in Perez and Expressions Hair Design, Sotomayor is not a fan
of decisions that fail to fully enlighten or elucidate larger principles. Interestingly,
Alito joined Sotomayor’s concurrence in Expressions Hair Design, thus distancing
himself again from Kennedy, who joined in Roberts’s opinion for the Court.
The bottom line from Expressions Hair Design is that although the Court
handed New York merchants a victory by holding that First Amendment interests
are at stake and vacating the Second Circuit’s decision to the contrary,204 not all the
justices were pleased. Breyer groused and grumbled about the speech-conduct
dichotomy and when various levels of judicial scrutiny should apply.205 Sotomayor,
in turn, was perturbed both at the Court’s “quarter-loaf” decision and the Second
Circuit’s failure to certify the statutory question.206
Ultimately, although Tam, Packingham, and Expressions Hair Design were
rendered without dissents, the justices failed to be on the same page in each case.207
Whether attributable to matters of doctrine, dicta or otherwise, the seemingly united
free-speech front of the Roberts Court is more façade than reality. Significantly,
both Tam and Packingham revealed a consistent divide between a bloc comprised
of Kennedy, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, on the one hand, and a group made
200 Id. at 1153.
201 Mark Chenoweth, Expressions Hair Design: Detangling the Commercial-Free-Speech
Knot, 2016–2017 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 227, 245 (2017).
202 See discussion supra Part I.
203 See Cameron L. Fields, Unraveling a Ball of Confusion: Layers of Criminal Intent,
Facebook, Rap, and Uncertainty in Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015), 36 MISS.
C. L. REV. 133, 137 (2017) (noting that the Court in Elonis “did not define what constituted a
true threat and seemingly rejected the objective standard the majority of the courts of appeals
had applied—but left nothing in its place” and adding that “[t]he Court furthermore did not ad-
dress the First Amendment issues involved in this case; it only analyzed the federal statute”).
204 See generally Expressions Hair Design, 137 S. Ct. 1144.
205 See id. at 1152–53 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
206 See id. at 1153 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment).
207 See supra notes 108–206 and accompanying text.
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up of Roberts, Alito, and Thomas, on the other.208 As noted earlier, Breyer joined the
latter coalition in Tam, but pivoted away to join the former in Packingham.209
III. DANGEROUS DICTA OR FREE-SPEECH FOUNTAINHEAD? A CLOSER
REVIEW OF KENNEDY’S PACKINGHAM “MUSINGS”210 REGARDING
ACCESS TO ONLINE SOCIAL NETWORKS
“Dicta,” as Professor Michael Dorf writes, “typically refers to statements in a
judicial opinion that are not necessary to support the decision reached by the court.”211
“Holdings,” in contrast, “carry greater precedential weight than dicta.”212 Professor
Randy Kozel concisely describes the precedential difference, at least in theory, as
“binding ‘holdings’ and dispensable ‘dicta.’”213
Yet, in reality, the distinction between dicta and holdings is increasingly blurry.
Judge Pierre Leval of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, for example,
asserts that:
The problem is that dicta no longer have the insignificance they
deserve. They are no longer ignored. Judges do more than put
faith in them; they are often treated as binding law. The distinc-
tion between dictum and holding is more and more frequently
disregarded. . . . Today more and more, dicta flex muscle to
which, I submit, they are not entitled by constitutional right.214
Dicta, in fact, have long played important roles in First Amendment free-speech
jurisprudence. For example, there was Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes’s “famous
dicta”215 in Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson216 articulating the limited times when prior
restraints might be permissible.217 Justice William Brennan later used part of that
208 See supra discussion Sections II.A–B.
209 See supra notes 111, 123, 128 and accompanying text (describing the alignment of
Justice Breyer in Tam and Packingham).
210 Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1738 (2017) (Alito, J., concurring in
the judgment).
211 Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 2000 (1994).
212 Id.
213 Randy J. Kozel, Stare Decisis in the Second-Best World, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 1139,
1143 (2015).
214 Pierre N. Leval, Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1249, 1250 (2006).
215 Christopher Dunn, Balancing the Right to Protest in the Aftermath of September 11,
40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 327, 329 (2005).
216 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
217 See id. at 716 (identifying times of war, “obscene publications,” and “incitements to acts
of violence and the overthrow by force of orderly government” as the “exceptional” cases when
a “previous restraint” may be permissible).
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dicta to support his stance in New York Times Co. v. United States218 that “only gov-
ernmental allegation and proof that publication must inevitably, directly, and imme-
diately cause the occurrence of an event kindred to imperiling the safety of a transport
already at sea can support even the issuance of an interim restraining order.”219
Indeed, as Professor Michael Meyerson points out, “[t]he usual starting point for
analyzing the exceptions to the prior restraint doctrine is the dicta from Near.”220
Another example of dicta influencing free-speech jurisprudence stems from
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.221 There, as Professor Brooks Fuller observes, the
Court “outlined several categories of unprotected speech under the First Amendment
in dicta.”222 This “infamous dicta,”223 penned by Justice Frank Murphy in 1942, reads:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of
speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never
been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include
the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting
or “fighting” words—those which by their very utterance inflict
injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has
been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of
any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a
step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.224
The latter part of that dicta spawned the low-value theory in First Amendment
jurisprudence.225 It proved highly influential.226 Attorney John Wirenius asserts:
218 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam).
219 Id. at 726–27 (Brennan, J., concurring); see Mary-Rose Papandrea, Lapdogs, Watchdogs,
and Scapegoats: The Press and National Security Information, 83 IND. L.J. 233, 279 (2008)
(noting that “Brennan drew this standard from dicta in the Court’s prior opinion in Near v.
Minnesota” and, in particular, the Near Court’s statement “that prior restraints are permissible
in cases involving ‘actual obstruction to [the government’s] recruiting service or the publica-
tion of the sailing dates of transports or the number and location of troops’” (alteration in
original) (quoting Near, 283 U.S. at 716)).
220 Michael I. Meyerson, Rewriting Near v. Minnesota: Creating a Complete Definition
of Prior Restraint, 52 MERCER L. REV. 1087, 1106 (2001).
221 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
222 P. Brooks Fuller, The Angry Pamphleteer: True Threats, Political Speech, and Apply-
ing Watts v. United States in the Age of Twitter, 21 COMM. L. & POL’Y 87, 87 n.1 (2016).
223 Stephen Fraser, The Conflict Between the First Amendment and Copyright Law and
Its Impact on the Internet, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 6 n.32 (1998).
224 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571–72 (footnotes omitted).
225 See Enrique Armijo, Reed v. Town of Gilbert: Relax, Everybody, 58 B.C. L. REV. 65,
73 (2017) (noting “the traditional low-value categories of speech derived from the Court’s 1942
decision in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire that have long been thought to rest outside of the First
Amendment’s protection”); Christopher M. Schultz, Content-Based Restrictions on Free
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“What is astonishing about this dictum is the casual ease with which the Court brushes
aside the constitutional question, and the breadth of its doctrine. With a single stroke,
the Court purports to settle not only the case at hand, but the questions of obscenity,
libel and ‘lewd’ speech.”227 He adds that Chaplinsky’s impact “cannot be overesti-
mated. The slowly maturing, and essentially coherent functional tradition . . . was
shattered at a blow, and replaced with a highly subjective jurisprudence, which
ranked speech by its ‘value’ (in the opinion of the individual justices on the Court
at the time).”228 It was not until the Court’s 2010 decision in United States v.
Stevens229 that the Court made evident that the value of speech is not determinative
of whether it receives First Amendment protection.230
When it comes to libel, Professors Alan Chen and Justin Marceau wrote that
“[t]he Court strongly suggested in its Chaplinsky dicta that libel has no First Amend-
ment value because defamatory statements serve no truth finding function and also
cause harm to those whose reputations are damaged by them.”231 Professor
Genevieve Lakier concurs, noting that “the Chaplinsky Court only suggested in
dicta” that libel is not protected by the First Amendment.232 This would change, of
Expression: Reevaluating the High Versus Low Value Speech Distinction, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 573,
577 (1999) (“The ‘low value theory’ first appeared in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire . . . .”).
226 See Christina E. Wells, Reinvigorating Autonomy: Freedom and Responsibility in the
Supreme Court’s First Amendment Jurisprudence, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 159, 177 n.73
(1997) (observing that “the Chaplinsky language, or variants thereof, has appeared in almost
all of the low-value speech cases”).
227 John F. Wirenius, The Road Not Taken: The Curse of Chaplinsky, 24 CAP. U. L. REV.
331, 332–33 (1995).
228 Id. at 333 (emphasis removed).
229 559 U.S. 460 (2010).
230 Chief Justice John Roberts explained for the Stevens majority:
The First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech does not extend only to
categories of speech that survive an ad hoc balancing of relative social
costs and benefits. The First Amendment itself reflects a judgment by the
American people that the benefits of its restrictions on the Government
outweigh the costs. Our Constitution forecloses any attempt to revise
that judgment simply on the basis that some speech is not worth it.
Id. at 470. Roberts added that the descriptions in Chaplinsky and related cases do “not set
forth a test that may be applied as a general matter to permit the Government to imprison any
speaker so long as his speech is deemed valueless or unnecessary, or so long as an ad hoc
calculus of costs and benefits tilts in a statute’s favor.” Id. at 471; see Paul Horwitz, The First
Amendment’s Epistemological Problem, 87 WASH. L. REV. 445, 460 (2012) (noting that the
Court in Stevens “acknowledged that Chaplinsky seemed to suggest such a balancing inquiry,
but denied that this formula should be applied to each new proposed category,” and adding
that the Stevens “Court refused to engage in an interest-balancing inquiry in order to deter-
mine which categories of speech fall into the low-value category”).
231 Alan K. Chen & Justin Marceau, High Value Lies, Ugly Truths, and the First Amendment,
68 VAND. L. REV. 1435, 1447 (2015).
232 Genevieve Lakier, The Invention of Low-Value Speech, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2166, 2174
(2015).
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course, with the Court’s 1964 decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan233 adding
the actual malice standard as a layer of First Amendment protection in libel cases
brought by public officials.234
Chaplinsky’s dicta was quoted favorably in 1957 by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Roth v. United States235 to support the proposition that obscene speech falls outside
the scope of First Amendment protection.236 Obscenity237 remains unprotected today.238
Beyond the Free Speech Clause, as Professor RonNell Andersen Jones carefully
chronicles, the Court has engaged in an “unusual pattern of excessive dicta” express-
ing “the unique role of the press in society and the democratic function that it serves”
as safeguarded by the Free Press Clause.239 As she puts it, the Court’s “substantial
dialogue about the media’s democratic traits and positive characteristics is non-
binding dicta.”240 Andersen Jones contends “that the Court’s patterns of tangentially
praising or criticizing the press and opining about its role in a democracy in cases
not squarely reaching a Press Clause holding are jurisprudentially dangerous.”241
And just as it is not unusual for scholars like Andersen Jones to criticize the
Court’s use of dicta in First Amendment cases, so too is it not rare for the justices
to disparage each other for authoring dicta. Recently, for example, Justice Scalia
derided Chief Justice Roberts for writing “seven pages of the purest dicta” in the
abortion-facility, buffer-zone case of McCullen v. Coakley.242
As described in Section II.B, Justice Alito complained about Justice Kennedy’s
Packingham dicta equating the Internet and online social networks with streets and
parks as venues for expression.243 Kennedy’s dicta stressed the importance of
233 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
234 Justice William Brennan explained in Sullivan that:
The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that pro-
hibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory false-
hood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement
was made with “actual malice”—that is, with knowledge that it was false
or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.
Id. at 279–80.
235 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
236 Specifically, the Roth Court cited Near, as well as other decisions, to support its
assertion that “expressions found in numerous opinions indicate that this Court has always
assumed that obscenity is not protected by the freedoms of speech and press.” Id. at 481.
237 The Court currently uses a three-part test for determining if sexually explicit speech is
obscene. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (setting forth the test for obscenity).
238 See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717 (2012) (plurality opinion) (identifying
obscenity as one of the historically unprotected categories of speech).
239 RonNell Anderson Jones, The Dangers of Press Clause Dicta, 48 GA. L. REV. 705, 707
(2014).
240 Id. at 714.
241 Id. at 727.
242 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2541 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
243 See supra notes 143–49 and accompanying text (summarizing Alito’s criticisms of
Kennedy’s dicta).
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citizens having access to online social networks as fora “for the exchange of views,”
including engagement with “their elected representatives.”244
Alito worried Kennedy’s language would hamstring lawmakers’ ability to ban
pedophiles from accessing websites where they could prey on minors.245 Yet there
is an exceedingly positive flipside to the dicta. Specifically, the more important and
decidedly constructive ramification of Kennedy’s words is to provide theoretical
footing for recognizing a First Amendment right to access government officials’
Twitter and Facebook accounts.
Especially vital in this latter, more hopeful scenario, is the connection among
three Kennedy statements in Packingham. First, he called it “[a] fundamental
principle of the First Amendment . . . that all persons have access to places where
they can speak and listen, and then, after reflection, speak and listen once more.”246
In brief, public access to fora for exchanges of expression is “fundamental.”247
Second, Kennedy stressed that online social networks now constitute “the most
important places” for such exchanges.248 In other words, social networks are
modern-day communicative fora. Third, Kennedy observed that “on Twitter, users
can petition their elected representatives and otherwise engage with them in a direct
manner. Indeed, Governors in all [fifty] States and almost every Member of Con-
gress have set up accounts for this purpose.”249
These three statements, when viewed in the larger context of the privileged
position political speech takes in First Amendment jurisprudence,250 lay the founda-
tion for a right to access the social media accounts of government officials. Ken-
nedy, in other words, logically bridged three key variables: (1) a First Amendment
right of public access to fora for communicative exchanges; (2) recognition that
online social networks are such fora; and (3) the use of such fora by government
officials for communicative interactions with the public.
244 Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017).
245 See id. at 1743 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (contending that, in light of
Kennedy’s dicta, “States may have little ability to restrict the sites that may be visited by even
the most dangerous sex offenders,” and questioning whether, based on Kennedy’s opinion,
“a State [may] preclude an adult previously convicted of molesting children from visiting a
dating site for teenagers”).
246 Id. at 1735 (majority opinion).
247 Id.
248 Id.
249 Id.
250 See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 349 (2010) (“If the First Amendment
has any force, it prohibits Congress from fining or jailing citizens, or associations of citizens, for
simply engaging in political speech.”); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 347
(1995) (“When a law burdens core political speech, we apply ‘exacting scrutiny,’ and we uphold
the restriction only if it is narrowly tailored to serve an overriding state interest.”); Monitor
Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971) (asserting that when it comes to the First Amend-
ment freedom of speech, “it can hardly be doubted that the constitutional guarantee has its
fullest and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office”).
926 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 26:899
Whether a First Amendment right to access the social network accounts of gov-
ernment officials exists is now squarely at issue in Knight First Amendment Institute
at Columbia University v. Trump.251 It was filed in July 2017 in federal court in the
Southern District of New York.252 The lawsuit, brought on behalf of multiple Twitter
users blocked from President Donald J. Trump’s personal @realDonaldTrump account
after criticizing him,253 quotes several statements by Kennedy in Packingham.254 In
addition to mentioning Kennedy’s observation noted above regarding how multiple
politicians use Twitter,255 the complaint cites Kennedy’s remark that social media
websites can provide “perhaps the most powerful mechanisms available to a private
citizen to make his or her voice heard.”256
The Knight plaintiffs argue, among other things, that “[b]ecause of the way in
which President Trump uses @realDonaldTrump, the account has become an
important channel for news about the presidency and the U.S. government. Those
who are blocked from the account are impeded in their ability to learn information
that is shared only through that account.”257 The complaint adds that the President’s
personal Twitter account constitutes “a kind of digital town hall in which the
President and his aides use the tweet function to communicate news and information
to the public, and members of the public use the reply function to respond to the
President and his aides and exchange views with one another.”258
Although the complaint neither cites nor quotes Alexander Meiklejohn, its refer-
ence to a “digital town hall”259 readily evokes Meiklejohn’s discussion “of the tradi-
tional American town meeting.”260 Meiklejohn used the town meeting to describe the
purpose of free speech—namely, producing “the voting of wise decisions”—as well
as the limits that may be imposed on free expression.261 As Meiklejohn put it:
Every man is free to come. They meet as political equals. Each has
a duty to think his own thoughts, to express them, and to listen to
the arguments of others. The basic principle is that the freedom
of speech shall be unabridged. And yet the meeting cannot even
be opened unless, by common consent, speech is abridged.262
251 Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia
Univ. v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv-05205 (S.D.N.Y. July 11, 2017) [hereinafter Knight Complaint].
252 Id. at 1.
253 Id.
254 Id. at 1–2.
255 Id. at 2.
256 Id. at 1 (quoting Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017)).
257 Id. at 16.
258 Id. (emphasis added).
259 Id.
260 MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 139, at 22.
261 Id. at 25.
262 Id. at 22.
2018] BEYOND HEADLINES & HOLDINGS 927
In addition to playing a key role in the Knight First Amendment Institute’s lawsuit
against Trump, Packingham’s dicta are central to the case of Leuthy v. LePage.263 It
was filed in federal court by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of Maine
in August 2017.264 The Leuthy complaint argues that Maine Governor Paul LePage
violated the First Amendment rights of both speech and petition of two Pine Tree
State residents when he banned them from his Facebook page and censored their
comments.265 Quoting Packingham, the Leuthy plaintiffs averred:
As the Supreme Court stated last month, Facebook, Twitter, and
other social media platforms provide “perhaps the most powerful
mechanisms available to a private citizen to make his or her voice
heard.” The Supreme Court additionally stated that these platforms
are “revolution[ary]” in their ability to increase civic engage-
ment with elected officials through the instantaneous and direct
communication opportunities provided by these platforms.266
A similar lawsuit, Laurenson v. Hogan,267 was filed in federal court in August
2017 against Maryland Governor Lawrence Hogan.268 According to the Washington
Post, “Hogan’s staff has blocked and deleted the posts of at least 450 people who
voiced their opinions on his official Facebook page.”269 The Laurenson complaint
cites Kennedy’s dicta from Packingham praising the merits of online social media
as fora for the exchange of ideas.270 The Laurenson plaintiffs contend Hogan “and
his staff recently promulgated a vague, broadly worded ‘Social Media Policy’ that
263 Complaint: Declaratory & Injunctive Relief Requested at 2, Leuthy v. LePage, No.
1:17-cv-00296-JAW (D. Me. Aug. 8, 2017) [hereinafter Leuthy Complaint].
264 Id. at 1.
265 The complaint provides, in key part, that:
Plaintiffs include the Governor’s constituents from who have been banned
from interacting on his page and have had their comments deleted due to
their criticism of the Governor and his policies. As a result of their criti-
cism, Plaintiffs have been impeded from commenting on the Governor’s
posts, sharing his posts, or having any type of discussions on his posts.
As a limited public forum, especially one in which individuals are par-
ticipating in political speech, the Plaintiffs’ are protected by the First
Amendment, and the Governor’s actions constitute unlawful, viewpoint-
based exclusion.
Id. at 3.
266 Id. at 2 (alteration in original) (quoting Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730,
1736–37 (2017)).
267 Complaint for Injunctive & Declaratory Relief & Damages, Laurenson v. Hogan, No.
8:17-cv-02162-DKC (D. Md. Aug. 1, 2017) [hereinafter Laurenson Complaint].
268 Id. at 1.
269 Petula Dvorak, Why Blocking Facebook Critics Could Leave Us ‘Dumb & Silent,’
WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 2017, at B1.
270 Laurenson Complaint, supra note 267, at 3, 19, and 21.
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purports to authorize the deletion of comments that are somehow ‘inappropriate,’
or that are not ‘about’ something the Governor has posted, and the blocking of
posters who make such comments.”271
Additionally, in Morgan v. Bevin272 the ACLU sued Kentucky Governor Matt
Bevin on behalf of two Bluegrass State residents.273 Specifically, Drew Morgan and
Mary Hargis allege they were “permanently blocked from one of the Governor’s
social media sites thus preventing them from contributing to the political dialogue
occurring in those public forums and, in the case of Twitter, viewing the content
posted by the Government or the comments of others.”274 Unlike Knight, Leuthy, and
Laurenson, however, the complaint in Morgan does not cite Kennedy’s Packingham
dicta.275 The gist, however, is substantially the same. As the Morgan complaint
claims, “permanently barring individuals and organizations from being able to post
comments on his [Governor Bevin’s] official Twitter and Facebook accounts is an
unconstitutional restriction on their right to engage in speech.”276
At the heart of all of these lawsuits is the nexus of: (1) access; (2) free speech;
(3) the right to petition government officials; and (4) new communications technol-
ogy. As Deborah Jeon, Legal Director for the Maryland ACLU, remarked about the
lawsuit against Governor Hogan, “[t]he highest purpose of the First Amendment is
to protect the right of Americans to engage in political speech and to petition the
government to address their concerns.”277
An additional aspect of the Knight First Amendment Institute’s complaint—
namely, its focus on viewpoint discrimination—is important as it relates to one of
the Supreme Court’s decisions from the first half of 2017.278 Specifically, the Knight
complaint contends that Trump’s “blocking of the Individual Plaintiffs from the
@realDonaldTrump account violates the First Amendment because it imposes a
viewpoint-based restriction on the Individual Plaintiffs’ participation in a public
forum.”279 The complaint adds that Trump’s blocking also “violates the First
Amendment because it imposes a viewpoint-based restriction on the Individual
Plaintiffs’ ability to petition the government for redress of grievances.”280 Indeed,
as Dean Erwin Chemerinsky tidily sums up the viewpoint discrimination in all of
271 Id. at 2.
272 Verified Complaint, Morgan v. Bevin, No. 3:17-cv-00060-GFVT (E.D. Ky. July 31,
2017) [hereinafter Morgan Complaint].
273 See generally id.
274 Id. at 2.
275 See generally id.
276 Id. at 12.
277 Ovetta Wiggins, Blocked by Hogan on Facebook, 4 File Suit, WASH. POST, Aug. 2,
2017, at B1.
278 See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1763, 1765 (2017).
279 Knight Complaint, supra note 251, at 24.
280 Id.
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these cases, “[t]hese are government officials communicating about government
business. They can’t pick or choose based on who they like or who likes them.”281
As analyzed earlier, viewpoint discrimination played a key role in the Court’s
decision in Matal v. Tam.282 Yet, the justices fractured four-to-four on that doctrine’s
meaning and importance.283 Such differences, which are the focus of the next part
of this Article,284 could play a key role in the resolution of cases such as Knight First
Amendment Institute and Leuthy.
For now, it is clear that while Alito fretted over the possibly deleterious impact
of Kennedy’s “loose rhetoric”285 and “undisciplined dicta”286 in Packingham,287 the
same language is already playing a vital role in right-of-access cases pivoting on the
social media accounts of government officials.288 Kennedy’s dicta from Packingham,
for example, were cited multiple times by U.S. District Judge James Cacheris in his
July 2017 opinion in Davison v. Loudoun County Board of Supervisors.289 Cacheris
held that the Facebook account of a local government official was subject to the
First Amendment.290 Among other things, the Judge approvingly cited Packingham
for “comparing social media to traditional public fora such as parks and streets.”291
That, ironically, is the precise comparison to which Justice Alito so vehemently
objected.292 Whether Kennedy’s “exuberant celebration of social media’s place in
the First Amendment”293 ultimately proves as powerful or important as the dicta
described earlier in either Near294 or Chaplinsky,295 of course, remains to be seen.
281 Brady McCombs, Social Media Blocking Ignites Debate: Lawsuits Say Online Actions
of Politicians Violate Free Speech, PANTAGRAPH (Bloomington, Ill.), Aug. 11, 2017, at A1.
282 See discussion supra Section II.A.
283 See discussion supra Section II.A.
284 See discussion infra Part IV.
285 Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1743 (2017) (Alito, J., concurring in
the judgment).
286 Id. at 1738.
287 See id. (contending that Kennedy’s “language is bound to be interpreted by some to mean
that the States are largely powerless to restrict even the most dangerous sexual predators from
visiting any internet sites, including, for example, teenage dating sites and sites designed to
permit minors to discuss personal problems with their peers”).
288 See supra notes 251–81 and accompanying text.
289 No. 1:16cv932, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116208 (E.D. Va. July 25, 2017).
290 See id. at *30–31 (citing Packingham, 137 S. Ct. 1730).
291 Id. at *26.
292 See Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1738 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (“I cannot join
the opinion of the Court, however, because of its undisciplined dicta. The Court is unable to
resist musings that seem to equate the entirety of the internet with public streets and parks.”).
293 David T. Goldberg & Emily R. Zhang, Our Fellow American, the Registered Sex
Offender, 2016–2017 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 59, 96 (2017).
294 See supra notes 215–20 and accompanying text (addressing the dicta in Near).
295 See supra notes 221–38 and accompanying text (addressing the dicta in Chaplinsky).
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IV. DIFFERENT VIEWPOINTS ON VIEWPOINT DISCRIMINATION:
A CLOSER LOOK AT THE FRACTURE IN TAM
Free-speech jurisprudence generally hinges on a distinction between content-
neutral laws and those that discriminate against particular types of content, with the
former deemed less problematic than the latter.296 The U.S. Supreme Court has held
that “[c]ontent-based regulations are presumptively invalid”297 and typically subject
to strict scrutiny review.298
Content-neutral laws, as Professor Geoffrey Stone spells out, “limit communi-
cation without regard to the message conveyed,”299 while content-based statutes
“limit communications because of the message conveyed.”300
Viewpoint discrimination, in turn, constitutes what the Court more than twenty
years ago called “an egregious form of content discrimination.”301 It explained then
that “[w]hen the government targets not subject matter, but particular views taken by
speakers on a subject, the violation of the First Amendment is all the more blatant.”302
It is a dangerous “subset or particular instance of the more general phenomenon of con-
tent discrimination.”303 In brief, as Justice Ginsburg wrote in 2014, “[t]he First Amend-
ment, our precedent makes plain, disfavors viewpoint-based discrimination.”304
What, then, is viewpoint discrimination? Professor Erica Goldberg recently
articulated that “[t]he difference between content discrimination and viewpoint
discrimination is not precise, but viewpoint discrimination is considered the most
pernicious subset of content discrimination. If a restriction against lobbying exem-
plifies content-based discrimination, a restriction against lobbying in favor of animal
rights is an example of viewpoint-based discrimination.”305 A law targeting all speech
296 See Rebecca L. Brown, The Harm Principle and Free Speech, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 953,
967 (2016) (“The most salient pivot in free-speech jurisprudence today is the distinction be-
tween laws that are based on the content of speech and those that are neutral with respect to
content. While content-neutral laws are generally tolerated, current law proclaims that govern-
ment may not regulate speech based on its content.” (footnotes omitted)); Leslie Kendrick, Con-
tent Discrimination Revisited, 98 VA. L. REV. 231, 235 (2012) (explaining that the two primary
rationales “behind the content-discrimination principle are that it is usually wrong for the
government to regulate speech because of what it is saying and that it is usually acceptable,
as a First Amendment matter, for the government to regulate speech for reasons other than
what it is saying”).
297 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992).
298 See supra note 118 and accompanying text (addressing the strict scrutiny test).
299 Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 189, 189 (1983).
300 Id. at 190.
301 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995).
302 Id.
303 Id. at 831.
304 Wood v. Moss, 134 S. Ct. 2056, 2061 (2014).
305 Erica Goldberg, Free Speech Consequentialism, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 687, 743 n.287
(2016).
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about abortion from occurring in public thus is content-based but not viewpoint-
based because, as Professor Alan Chen notes, it does “not matter whether one’s view
is pro-choice, anti-abortion, neutral, or even non-political (e.g., scientific), as the
topic is simply off limits.”306
In Matal v. Tam, all eight justices agreed the disparagement clause was view-
point based.307 Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas
and Breyer, wrote that “[o]ur cases use the term ‘viewpoint’ discrimination in a
broad sense.”308 He failed, however, to articulate a test or rule for determining when
a law is viewpoint based.309 Alito merely concluded the disparagement clause is
viewpoint based because “[i]t denies registration to any mark that is offensive to a
substantial percentage of the members of any group” and, in turn, “[g]iving offense
is a viewpoint.”310 The entire analysis of viewpoint discrimination spanned a mere
two paragraphs.311 And although the Alito bloc found the clause was viewpoint
based, it nonetheless applied a lax, intermediate scrutiny standard of review to
analyze its constitutionality.312
Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Sotomayor and Kagan did not join with the Alito
bloc’s brief analysis of viewpoint discrimination.313 Instead, Kennedy penned a
concurrence for the quartet to explain “in greater detail why the First Amendment’s
protections against viewpoint discrimination apply to the trademark here” and to
illustrate why “the viewpoint discrimination rationale renders unnecessary any
extended treatment of other questions raised by the parties.”314
Kennedy articulated a crisp, easy-to-understand test for deciphering when
viewpoint discrimination exists: “whether—within the relevant subject category—
the government has singled out a subset of messages for disfavor based on the views
expressed.”315 This comports squarely with the principle described above that view-
point discrimination is a subset of content discrimination.316 Applying this rule to the
facts in Tam, Kennedy concluded the disparagement clause constitutes “the essence
of viewpoint discrimination”317 because, within the subject matter of trademarks
306 Alan K. Chen, Statutory Speech Bubbles, First Amendment Overbreadth, and Improper
Legislative Purpose, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 31, 39 n.42 (2003).
307 See generally 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017).
308 Id. at 1763 (plurality opinion).
309 Cf. id.
310 Id.
311 Id.
312 See id. at 1763–64 (applying the intermediate scrutiny standard used to analyze re-
strictions on commercial speech).
313 Alito’s analysis of viewpoint discrimination takes place in Part III, Section C of the
opinion. Id. at 1761–63; see id. at 1750 (noting that only Roberts, Thomas, and Breyer joined
Alito in Section III.C).
314 Id. at 1765 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
315 Id. at 1766.
316 See supra notes 299–306 and accompanying text.
317 Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1766 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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regulated by the clause (marks pertaining to persons, institutions, beliefs, and na-
tional symbols), “an applicant may register a positive or benign mark but not a
derogatory one. The law thus reflects the Government’s disapproval of a subset of
messages it finds offensive.”318
Because the clause was viewpoint based, Kennedy’s cohort found it “necessarily
invokes heightened scrutiny,” regardless of whether it regulated commercial speech.319
Recall the Alito group was willing to apply intermediate scrutiny.320 The only time,
in fact, that a viewpoint-based law is permissible, according to Kennedy, is when the
government either is the speaker or is using others to speak on its behalf.321
The differences in emphasis between the Alito and Kennedy blocs are clear.
Whereas Alito, in announcing the judgment of the Court, began by stressing that the
disparagement clause was unconstitutional because offensive speech is protected
under the First Amendment,322 Kennedy launched his concurrence by concentrating
on the fact that the clause was invalid because the First Amendment generally bars
viewpoint discrimination.323 The clause, Kennedy wrote, “constitutes viewpoint
discrimination—a form of speech suppression so potent that it must be subject to
rigorous constitutional scrutiny. The Government’s action and the statute on which
it is based cannot survive this scrutiny.”324
The contrast in approaches to Tam may be important. Was Tam a case about
protecting offensive speech (Alito) or was it a case about thwarting viewpoint
discrimination (Kennedy)? To wit, Alito quotes the Court’s observation in the flag-
burning decision of Texas v. Johnson325 that “[i]f there is a bedrock principle under-
lying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression
of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”326
Kennedy omits any reference to Johnson. Similarly, Alito quotes the Street v. New
York327 sentiment “public expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely because
the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their hearers.”328 Kennedy fails to cite,
318 Id.
319 Id. at 1767.
320 See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
321 Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1768 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(“It is telling that the Court’s precedents have recognized just one narrow situation in which
viewpoint discrimination is permissible: where the government itself is speaking or recruiting
others to communicate a message on its behalf.”).
322 Alito, in the second paragraph of the opinion, wrote that the disparagement clause “vio-
lates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. It offends a bedrock First Amendment
principle: Speech may not be banned on the ground that it expresses ideas that offend.” Id.
at 1751 (majority opinion).
323 Id. at 1765 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
324 Id.
325 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
326 Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1763 (plurality opinion) (quoting Johnson, 491 U.S. at 414).
327 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
328 Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1763 (plurality opinion) (quoting Street, 394 U.S. at 592).
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much less to quote, Street. The same holds true for the Court’s offensive speech case
of Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell329—Alito cites it,330 Kennedy does not.
All of this leads to a big-picture question: is the doctrine against viewpoint
discrimination—the doctrine to which Kennedy’s bloc devoted its concurrence—
separate and distinct from a right-to-offend doctrine331 on which Alito concentrated?
Or, is Tam simply one case in which the two doctrinal threads are woven together?
To the extent that “disparage” means to offend (rather than to praise or laud), then
the disparagement clause seemingly taps into both doctrines.
But surely Alito’s contention that the clause constitutes viewpoint discrimina-
tion because “[g]iving offense is a viewpoint”332 is a vast oversimplification. Seeing
the unclothed genitals and pubic area of an adult in a public place may offend
someone despite the fact that the unclothed genitals and pubic area express no
viewpoint and are not intended to convey any meaning by the naked individual.333
Similarly, hearing the word “shit” in a public place may offend, but the word “shit”
is not a viewpoint on excrement or anything.334 In brief, a word may offend a per-
son’s sensibilities without conveying a viewpoint on any subject matter. Viewpoint
discrimination, in Kennedy’s more accurate and complete articulation, initially requires
there be a topic or subject matter under consideration and then that the government
permits only certain views on that topic or subject matter.
Ultimately, Kennedy’s bloc in Tam provides a clear formula for ferreting out the
existence of viewpoint discrimination. Additionally, Kennedy’s position that view-
point discrimination is fatal unless the government is speaking draws a clear line
around it as verboten. This is a decidedly free-speech friendly doctrinal stance—one
much more favorable to First Amendment interests than the position and understand-
ing of viewpoint discrimination embraced by Justice Alito. Given the four-to-four split
between the Kennedy and Alito blocs on this matter in Tam, however, problems
could lie ahead in future cases when viewpoint discrimination is alleged.
329 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
330 Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1763 (plurality opinion).
331 See Leslie Gielow Jacobs, The Public Sensibilities Forum, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1357, 1357
(2001) (“The constitutional rule is clear: the government, and the public that it serves, must
tolerate even ‘outrageous’ and ‘offensive’ speech to fulfill the First Amendment’s guarantee of
a robust and wide open marketplace of ideas.” (footnotes omitted)); Eugene Volokh, Speech as
Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses of Conduct, “Situation-Altering Utter-
ances,” and the Uncharted Zones, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1277, 1304 (2005) (asserting that: [T]he
right to free speech is at its core the right to communicate—to persuade and to inform people
through the content of one’s message. The right must also generally include in considerable
measure the right to offend people through that content . . . .”) (emphasis added)).
332 Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1763 (plurality opinion).
333 But see Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 208–12 (1975) (holding that
nudity was a viewpoint in the context of films).
334 But see generally Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (holding that the state could
not regulate the content of speech merely because language offends).
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CONCLUSION
This Article explored four important facets of the U.S. Supreme Court’s rulings
affecting free speech from the first six months of 2017. First, it examined Justice
Sotomayor’s solo concurrence in Perez v. Florida.335 Her opinion vents frustration
with the Court’s failure to clarify the intent requirement of the true threats doctrine.336
Sotomayor also expressed concern with the real-world consequences of that failure
on individuals like Robert Perez. Not only did she call on the Court to clarify the
intent issue, but Sotomayor intimated she would adopt a different standard of intent
than that advocated by either Justice Alito or Justice Thomas in the Court’s 2015
decision in Elonis v. United States.337 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court in October
2017 passed on yet another opportunity to revisit the true threats doctrine when it
denied Anthony Elonis’s petition for a writ of certiorari to review the Third Circuit’s
2016 ruling affirming his prior conviction.338
Second, this Article punctured the superficial appearance of agreement among
the justices in the dissent-free First Amendment victories of Tam, Packingham, and
Expressions Hair Design.339 Although the trio of cases was handed down with nary
a dissent, not one was unanimous.340 The multiple concurring opinions revealed
fractures among the justices’ views on doctrines such as commercial speech and
viewpoint discrimination, as well as objections to both “undisciplined dicta”341 and
a “quarter-loaf outcome.”342 In brief, the justices are not on the same page in their
First Amendment playbooks, be it doctrinally or otherwise.
Third, this Article delved into Justice Kennedy’s dicta in Packingham. This
Article explored its almost immediate impact in a quartet of cases—Knight First
Amendment Institute, Leuthy, Laurenson, and Davison—regarding access to the social
media accounts of government officials.343 This comes despite Justice Alito’s near
panic over how the dicta might harm the ability of states to restrict sexual predators’
access to social networks frequented by minors.344 Just as Supreme Court dicta in
Near and Chaplinsky durably impacted First Amendment jurisprudence,345 so too
335 See discussion supra Part I.
336 See discussion supra Part I.
337 See discussion supra Part I.
338 United States v. Elonis, 841 F.3d 589 (3d Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 67 (2017).
339 See discussion supra Part II.
340 See discussion supra Part II.
341 Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1738 (2017) (Alito, J., concurring in
the judgment).
342 Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1153 (2017) (Sotomayor,
J., concurring in the judgment).
343 See discussion supra Part III.
344 See discussion supra Part III.
345 See supra notes 215–38 and accompanying text.
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might Kennedy’s judicial detour into the wonders of online social networks prove
powerful and permanent.
Fourth and finally, this Article analyzed the differences in Tam between compet-
ing four-Justice blocs on the subject of viewpoint discrimination.346 For Justice
Kennedy’s coalition, viewpoint discrimination triggers strict scrutiny even when
commercial speech is regulated.347 For Justice Alito’s bloc, that is not the case and
intermediate scrutiny still applies.348
There are, of course, other important aspects of the cases not explored in this
Article. Two readily come to mind. First, all eight justices in Tam joined in part of the
opinion pushing back against further expansion of the nascent and troublesome
government speech doctrine349 after the 2015 decision in Walker v. Texas Division,
Sons of Confederate Veterans.350 Justice Alito wrote in Tam that Walker “likely marks
the outer bounds of the government-speech doctrine.”351 The Tam Court’s analysis of
the government speech doctrine, however, is already adequately addressed elsewhere.352
Second, a different facet of Justice Kennedy’s dicta in Packingham already was
used by one federal district court. Specifically, Kennedy parenthetically wrote that
“[o]f importance, the troubling fact that the law imposes severe restrictions on
persons who already have served their sentence and are no longer subject to the
supervision of the criminal justice system is also not an issue before the Court.”353
346 See discussion supra Part IV.
347 See discussion supra Part IV.
348 See discussion supra Part IV.
349 See Eric C. Chaffee, The Origins of Corporate Social Responsibility, 85 U. CIN. L.
REV. 353, 373–74 (2017) (“The contours of the government speech doctrine are not well
defined because the case law is limited.”); Lyrissa Lidsky, Public Forum 2.0, 91 B.U. L. REV.
1975, 1976 (2011) (describing the government speech doctrine as “lacking in coherence—to
put it mildly”); Derek T. Muller, Ballot Speech, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 693, 733 (2016) (“Admittedly,
the contours of the government speech [doctrine] are notoriously unclear.”); Mary-Rose
Papandrea, The Free Speech Rights of University Students, 101 MINN. L. REV. 1801, 1846
(2017) (“The precise contours of the government speech doctrine are unclear, but the basic
idea is that the First Amendment does not apply when the government itself is speaking.”).
350 135 S. Ct. 2239 (2015). A five-Justice majority in Walker held that “specialty license
plates issued pursuant to Texas’s statutory scheme convey government speech.” Id. at 2246.
As such, Texas could permissibly refuse to grant the Sons of Confederate Veterans a specialty
plate featuring Confederate Battle Flag imagery. Id. at 2253. Justice Alito, joined by Chief
Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia and Kennedy, dissented. Id. at 2254 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Alito wrote that “[m]essages that are proposed by private parties and placed on Texas specialty
plates are private speech, not government speech. Texas cannot forbid private speech based on
its viewpoint. That is what it did here. Because the Court approves this violation of the First
Amendment, I respectfully dissent.” Id. at 2263.
351 Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1760 (2017).
352 See Clay Calvert, Beyond Trademarks and Offense: Tam and the Justices’ Evolution
on Free Speech, 2016–2017 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 25, 39–46 (2017) (analyzing the Tam Court’s
examination of the government speech doctrine).
353 Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017) (emphases added).
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In August 2017, Senior U.S. District Judge Richard Matsch quotes this statement in
Millard v. Rankin,354 calling it “significant.”355 That’s because the Colorado statute
at issue in Millard requires registered sex offenders who have successfully com-
pleted both their incarceration and probation356 to, among other items, register their
email accounts and online identities with the government.357 The plaintiffs chal-
lenged this for violating “the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and
unusual punishment and the Fourteenth Amendment’s requirements of procedural
and substantive due process.”358
Judge Matsch reasoned that the Colorado statute imposed “a ‘severe restriction’
like the provisions in Packingham.”359 He found that the statute “provides law
enforcement a supervisory tool to keep an eye out for registered sex offenders using
email and social media. That is one more restrictive and intrusive provision that
resembles the supervisory aspects of parole and probation . . . .”360 Matsch ultimately
concluded the statute, indeed, imposed cruel and unusual punishment on the plain-
tiffs.361 In brief, Kennedy’s Packingham dicta calling “troubling”362 restrictions on
social media use after individuals have completed prison time carries not only First
Amendment consequences, but also Eighth Amendment ramifications.
Ultimately, despite Dean Erwin Chemerinsky’s blunt questioning more than a
half-decade ago of whether the Roberts Court “is strongly protective of speech,”363
354 265 F. Supp. 3d 1211 (D. Colo. 2017), appeal filed, No. 17-1333 (10th Cir. Sept. 21,
2017).
355 Id. at 1228.
356 The lead plaintiff, David Millard, is a registered sex offender who completed “a sentence
of 90 days jail work release and eight years probation.” Id. at 1217.
357 Id. at 1228.
358 Id. at 1223. The Eighth Amendment provides that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required,
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” The Eighth Amend-
ment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment has been incorporated through the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause to apply to state governments. Robinson v. Cali-
fornia, 370 U.S. 660, 666–67 (1962).
359 Millard, 265 F. Supp. 3d at 1228 (quoting Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct.
1730, 1737 (2017)).
360 Id.
361 Id. at 1235.
362 Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1737.
363 Erwin Chemerinsky, Lecture, Not a Free Speech Court, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 723, 724
(2011). Chemerinsky concludes “that the Roberts Court’s overall record suggests that it is
not a free speech Court at all.” Id. Specifically, Chemerinsky points out that:
The Roberts Court has consistently ruled against free speech claims
when brought by government employees, by students, by prisoners, and
by those who challenge the government’s national security and military
policies. The pattern is uniform and troubling: when the government is
functioning as an authoritarian institution, freedom of speech always
loses.
Id. at 725.
2018] BEYOND HEADLINES & HOLDINGS 937
the first half of 2017 revealed it to be pro–free speech in terms of the outcomes in
Tam, Packingham, and Expressions Hair Design. And as Part III made clear,
Packingham already is profoundly impacting a series of new cases asserting a First
Amendment right of citizens to access the social media accounts of government
officials. More generally, Packingham already has been cited by one federal appel-
late court for the proposition that “[s]ex offenders have free-speech rights.”364
Yet, the Court’s decision to pass on hearing Perez leaves the true threats doctrine
languishing in disarray.365 Furthermore, each of the big three cases that it did hear
produced multiple opinions. So, while the initial six months of 2017 revealed the
Court generally to be free-speech friendly, the justices’ lack of unanimity augurs
future problems for First Amendment jurisprudence.
364 United States v. Cox, 871 F.3d 479, 494 (6th Cir. 2017) (Sutton, J., concurring), cert.
denied, 138 S. Ct. 754 (2018).
365 Wayne Batchis, On the Categorical Approach to Free Speech—And the Protracted
Failure to Delimit the True Threats Exception to the First Amendment, 37 PACE L. REV. 1,
47 (2016) (describing “how doctrinally under-theorized and woefully neglected the true threats
category has been, and remains”).
